On Thursday, September 3rd, 2020, Lets Encrypt issued six new certificates:
one root, four intermediates, and one cross-sign. These new certificates are
part of our larger plan to improve privacy on the web, by making ECDSA
end-entity certificates widely available, and by making certificates smaller.
Given that we issue 1.5 million certificates every day,
what makes these ones special? Why did we issue them? How did we issue them?
Lets answer these questions, and in the process take a tour of how
Certificate Authorities think and work.
Every publicly-trusted Certificate Authority (such as Lets Encrypt) has at
least one root certificate which is incorporated into various browser and OS
vendors (e.g. Mozilla, Google) trusted root stores. This is what allows
users who receive a certificate from a website to confirm that the
certificate was issued by an organization that their browser trusts. But root
certificates, by virtue of their widespread trust and long lives, must have
their corresponding private key carefully protected and stored offline, and
therefore cant be used to sign things all the time. So every Certificate
Authority (CA) also has some number of intermediates, certificates which
are able to issue additional certificates but are not roots, which they use
for day-to-day issuance.
For the last five years,
Lets Encrypt has had one root: the ISRG Root X1,
which has a 4096-bit RSA key and is valid until 2035.
Over that same time, weve had four intermediates: the Lets Encrypt
Authorities X1, X2,
X3, and X4. The
first two were issued when Lets Encrypt first began operations in 2015, and
were valid for 5 years. The latter two were issued about a year later, in
2016, and are also valid for 5 years, expiring about this time next year. All
of these intermediates use 2048-bit RSA keys. In addition,
all of these intermediates are cross-signed
by IdenTrusts DST Root CA X3, another root certificate controlled by a
different certificate authority which is trusted by most root stores.
Finally, we also have the ISRG Root OCSP X1
certificate. This one is a little different – it doesnt issue any
certificates. Instead, it signs Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
responses that indicate the intermediate certificates have not been revoked.
This is important because the only other thing capable of signing such
statements is our root itself, and as mentioned above, the root needs to stay
offline and safely secured.
The New Certificates
For starters, weve issued two new 2048-bit RSA intermediates which were
calling R3 and
R4. These are both issued by ISRG Root X1, and
have 5-year lifetimes. They will also be cross-signed by IdenTrust. Theyre
basically direct replacements for our current X3 and X4, which are expiring
in a year. We expect to switch our primary issuance pipeline to use R3 later
this year, which wont have any real effect on issuance or renewal.
The other new certificates are more interesting. First up, we have the new
ISRG Root X2, which has an ECDSA P-384 key
instead of RSA, and is valid until 2040. Issued from that, we have two new
intermediates, E1 and
E2, which are both also ECDSA and are valid
for 5 years.
Notably, these ECDSA intermediates are not cross-signed by IdenTrusts DST
Root CA X3. Instead, the ISRG Root X2 itself is
cross-signed by our existing ISRG Root X1.
An astute observer might also notice that we have not issued an OCSP Signing
Certificate from ISRG Root X2.
Now that we have the technical details out of the way, lets dive in to why
the new hierarchy looks the way it does.
There are lots of other articles
you can read about the benefits of ECDSA (smaller key sizes for the same
level of security; correspondingly faster encryption, decryption, signing,
and verification operations; and more). But for us, the big benefit comes
from their smaller certificate sizes.
Every connection to a remote domain over https:// requires a TLS handshake.
Every TLS handshake requires that the server provide its certificate.
Validating that certificate requires a certificate chain (the list of all
intermediates up to but not including a trusted root), which is also usually
provided by the server. This means that every connection – and a page
covered in ads and tracking pixels might have dozens or hundreds – ends up
transmitting a large amount of certificate data. And every certificate
contains both its own public key and a signature provided by its issuer.
While a 2048-bit RSA public key is about 256 bytes long, an ECDSA P-384
public key is only about 48 bytes. Similarly, the RSA signature will be
another 256 bytes, while the ECDSA signature will only be 96 bytes. Factoring
in some additional overhead, thats a savings of nearly 400 bytes per
certificate. Multiply that by how many certificates are in your chain, and
how many connections you get in a day, and the bandwidth savings add up fast.
These savings are a public benefit both for our subscribers who can be
sites for which bandwidth can be a meaningful cost every month and for
end-users, who may have limited or metered connections. Bringing privacy to
the whole Web doesnt just mean making certificates available, it means
making them efficient, too.
As an aside: since were concerned about certificate sizes, weve also taken
a few other measures to save bytes in our new certificates. Weve shortened
their Subject Common Names from Lets Encrypt Authority X3 to just R3,
relying on the previously-redundant Organization Name field to supply the
words Lets Encrypt. Weve shortened their Authority Information Access
Issuer and CRL Distribution Point URLs, and weve dropped their CPS and OCSP
urls entirely. All of this adds up to another approximately 120 bytes of
savings without making any substantive change to the useful information in
Why We Cross-Signed the ECDSA Root
Cross-signing is an important step, bridging the gap between when a new root
certificate is issued and when that root is incorporated into various trust
stores. We know that it is going to take 5 years or so for our new ISRG Root
X2 to be widely trusted itself, so in order for certificates issued by the E1
intermediate to be trusted, there needs to be a cross-sign somewhere in the
We had basically two options: we could cross-sign the new ISRG Root X2 from
our existing ISRG Root X1, or we could cross-sign the new E1 and E2
intermediates from ISRG Root X1. Lets examine the pros and cons of each.
Cross-signing the new ISRG Root X2 certificate means that, if a user has ISRG
Root X2 in their trust store, then their full certificate chain will be 100%
ECDSA, giving them fast validation, as discussed above. And over the next few
years, as ISRG Root X2 is incorporated into more and more trust stores,
validation of ECDSA end-entity certificates will get faster without users or
websites having to change anything. The tradeoff though is that, as long as
X2 isnt in trust stores, user agents will have to validate a chain with two
intermediates: both E1 and X2 chaining up to the X1 root. This takes more
time during certificate validation.
Cross-signing the intermediates directly has the opposite tradeoff. On the
one hand, all of our chains will be the same length, with just one
intermediate between the subscriber certificate and the widely-trusted ISRG
Root X1. But on the other hand, when the ISRG Root X2 does become widely
trusted, wed have to go through another chain switch
in order for anyone to gain the benefits of an all-ECDSA chain.
In the end, we decided that providing the option of all-ECDSA chains was more
important, and so opted to go with the first option, and cross-sign the ISRG
Root X2 itself.
The Online Certificate Status Protocol is a way for user agents to discover,
in real time, whether or not a certificate theyre validating has been
revoked. Whenever a browser wants to know if a certificate is still valid, it
can simply hit a URL contained within the certificate itself and get a yes or
no response, which is signed by another certificate and can be similarly
validated. This is great for end-entity certificates, because the responses
are small and fast, and any given user might care about (and therefore have
to fetch) the validity of wildly different sets of certificates, depending on
what sites they visit.
But intermediate certificates are a tiny subset of all certificates in the
wild, are generally well-known, and are rarely revoked. Because of this, it
can be much more efficient to simply maintain a Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) containing validity information for all well-known intermediates. Our
intermediate certificates all contain a URL from which a browser can fetch
their CRL, and in fact some browsers even aggregate these into their own CRLs
which they distribute with each update. This means that checking the
revocation status of intermediates doesnt require an extra network round
trip before you can load a site, resulting in a better experience for
In fact, a recent change (ballot SC31)
to the Baseline Requirements, which govern CAs, has made it so intermediate
certificates are no longer required to include an OCSP URL; they can now have
their revocation status served solely by CRL. And as noted above, we have
removed the OCSP URL from our new intermediates. As a result, we didnt need
to issue an OCSP responder signed by ISRG Root X2.
Putting It All Together
Now that weve shared our new certificates look the way they do, theres one
last thing wed like to mention: how we actually went about issuing them.
The creation of new root and intermediate certificates is a big deal, since
their contents are so regulated and their private keys have to be so
carefully protected. So much so that the act of issuing new ones is called a
ceremony. Lets Encrypt believes strongly in automation,
so we wanted our ceremony to require as little human involvement as possible.
Over the last few months weve built a ceremony tool
which, given appropriate configuration, can produce all of the desired keys,
certificates, and requests for cross-signs. We also built a
demo of our ceremony,
showing what our configuration files would be, and allowing anyone to run it
themselves and examine the resulting output. Our SREs put together a replica
network, complete with Hardware Security Modules, and practiced the ceremony
multiple times to ensure it would work flawlessly. We shared this demo with
our technical advisory board, our community, and various mailing lists, and
in the process received valuable feedback that actually influenced some of
the decisions weve talked about above! Finally, on September 3rd, our
Executive Director met with SREs at a secure datacenter to execute the whole
ceremony, and record it for future audits.
And now the ceremony is complete. Weve updated our certificates page
to include details about all of our new certificates, and are beginning the
process of requesting that our new root be incorporated into various trust
stores. We intend to begin issuing with our new intermediates over the coming
weeks, and will post further announcements in our community forum
when we do.
We hope that this has been an interesting and informative tour around our
hierarchy, and we look forward to continuing to improve the internet one
certificate at a time. Wed like to thank IdenTrust for their early and
ongoing support of our vision to change security on the Web for the better.
We depend on contributions from our community of users and supporters in
order to provide our services. If your company or organization would like to
sponsor Lets Encrypt please
email us at firstname.lastname@example.org. We ask that you make an
individual contribution if it is within your
On Thursday, September 3rd, 2020, Lets Encrypt issued six new certificates: